Punishment despite Reasonable Doubt – A Public Goods Experiment with Uncertainty over Contributions by Kristoffel Grechenig et al.
MAX PLANCK SOCIETY
Preprints of the
Max Planck Institute for
Research on Collective Goods
Bonn 2010/11
Punishment despite 
Reasonable Doubt – 
A Public Goods Experiment 




Christian ThöniPreprints of the 
Max Planck Institute 
for Research on Collective Goods  Bonn 2010/10
Punishment despite Reasonable Doubt 
– A Public Goods Experiment with Uncertainty 
over Contributions
Christoffel Grechenig / Andreas Nicklisch / Christian Thöni
April 2010
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, D-53113 Bonn 
http://www.coll.mpg.de  1 
  PUNISHMENT DESPITE REASONABLE DOUBT 




UNIVERSITY OF ST. GALLEN, DEPARTMENT OF LAW 
BODANSTR. 4, 9000 ST. GALLEN, SWITZERLAND 
+41 71 224 3006 ▪ KRISTOFFEL.GRECHENIG@UNISG.CH 
& 
MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON COLLECTIVE GOODS 
KURT SCHUMACHER STRASSE 10, 53113 BONN, GERMANY 
+49 228 91416 51 ▪ GRECHENIG@COLL.MPG.DE 
 
    ANDREAS NICKLISCH 
MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON COLLECTIVE GOODS 
KURT SCHUMACHER STRASSE 10, 53113 BONN, GERMANY 
+49 228 91416 79 ▪ NICKLISCH@COLL.MPG.DE 
 
CHRISTIAN THÖNI 
UNIVERSITY OF ST. GALLEN, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
VARNBÜELSTR. 14, 9000 ST. GALLEN, SWITZERLAND 
+41 71 224 2548 ▪ CHRISTIAN.THOENI@UNISG.CH 
 
Abstract 
Under  a  great  variety  of  legally  relevant  circumstances,  people  have  to 
decide whether or not to cooperate, when they face an incentive to defect. 
The law sometimes provides people with sanctioning mechanisms to enforce 
pro social  behavior.  Experimental  evidence  on  voluntary  public  good 
provision  shows  that  the  option  to  punish  others  substantially  improves 
cooperation, even if punishment is costly. However, these studies focus on 
situations  where  there  is  no  uncertainty  about  others'  behavior.  We 
investigate  punishment  in  a  world  with  “reasonable  doubt”  about  others' 
contributions. Interestingly, people reveal a high willingness to punish even 
if their information about cooperation rates is inaccurate, or noisy. If there is 
some  non trivial  degree  of  noise,  punishment  (1)  cannot  maintain  high 
contributions  and  (2)  reduces  welfare  even  below  the  level  of  a  setting 
without  punishment.  Our  findings  suggest  that  sufficient  information 
accuracy  about  others'  behavior  is  crucial  for  the  efficiency  of  sanction 
mechanisms.  If  a  situation  is  characterized  by  low  information  accuracy, 
precluding sanctions can be optimal. 
 
JEL Classifications: C91, D03, H41, K14, K42. 
Keywords: Experimental Law & Economics, Public Goods, Enforcement under Uncertainty. 
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Introduction 
 
“Far  be  it  from  you  to  do  such  a  thing—to  kill  the  righteous  with  the 
wicked, treating the righteous and the wicked alike.” [...] The Lord said, 
“If I find fifty righteous people in the city of Sodom, I will spare the whole 
place for their sake.” 
Genesis 18, 25 26 
 
Sanctions  are  a  key  element  of  justice,  where  interventions  try  to  reduce  incentives  for 
misbehavior. An ideal setting would provide perfect information, that is, people who have to 
decide whether to impose sanctions would be aware of all relevant facts. Reality is much less 
perfect. Decision makers typically face imprecise, contradicting, or even wrong information. 
This raises the issue of whether the premise that people are imperfectly or noisily informed 
systematically influences their disposition to use sanctions. Using an experimental approach, 
we contribute to this debate by studying the effects of a ceteris paribus variation of the 
accuracy of information about other people's behavior. First, we ask how the fact that people 
receive  noisy  information  about  the  behavior  of  those  to  be  sanctioned  affects  their 
willingness to execute sanctions (punishment). Second, we examine how sanctioned persons 
respond  to  punishment  that  they  receive  under  a  noisy  information  system.  Third,  we 
analyze how sanctions affect cooperation and efficiency in this situation. 
 
The implications of imperfect or noisy information on sanctioning mechanisms have received 
some  attention  in  the  literature.
1  Lawyers  have  often  made  intuitive  statements,  most 
famously William Blackstone (1765 1769, book 4, ch. 27) indicating that “the law holds, that 
it  is  better  that  ten  guilty  persons  escape,  than  that  one  innocent  suffer.”  In  fact,  this 
statement has become a common convention implying that people follow the norm not to 
apply sanctions if the information is very noisy. Sanctions include reports of criminal behavior 
to  the  police,  economic  sanctions  under  international  law,  private  law  suits,  etc.  The 
individual rationality for abstaining from sanctioning in a noisy information system derives 
from a common understanding: a sanction regime may cause two distinct types of errors, 
“type I” errors, which is the case when innocent defendants are found guilty, and “type II” 
errors,  when  guilty  defendants  escape  punishment  (see,  e.g.,  Ehrlich,  1982,  Polinsky  & 
Shavell, 1989, Miceli, 1991). According to the common understanding, the social damage of 
a regime that minimizes “type I” errors at the cost of “type II” errors is substantially lower 
than the damage of a regime that allows for “type I” errors in order to avoid “type II” errors. 
While various authors (recently Blume, 2008, Feess & Wohlschlegel, 2009) have emphasized 
                                                 
1 Compare, e.g., Png (1986), Rubinfeld & Sappington (1987), Volokh (1997), Rachlinski & Foulden 
(2003), Eisenberg et al. (2005), Polinsky & Shavell (2007), Eisenberg & Hans (2009).   3 
the costs of “type I” errors, there is currently little evidence about the size of these costs.
2 
The purpose of this article is to explore (a) whether people in fact exhibit a decline in their 
willingness to execute punishment given that they are uncertain about others' behavior, and 
(b) whether social welfare in a sanctioning regime (with “type I” and “type II” errors) is in 
fact superior to a regime where no sanction possibilities are available, i.e., where “type I” 




Experimental economics provides social dilemma games as ideal workhorses for this class of 
questions, as people interact in groups in such a way that cooperation is optimal from a 
welfare perspective, but defection is rational for each individual. Among other mechanisms, 
like  social  norms  and  habits,  sanctions  serve  as  an  important  mechanism  in  maintaining 
social cooperation, as they offer participants the ability to enforce pro social behavior by 
sanctioning  defection.  Previous  research  has  drawn  special  attention  to  decentralized 
sanctioning, where subjects can distribute points which reduce both other group members' – 
and their own – income. Fehr & Gächter (2000, 2002) show that subjects mainly use the 
punishment option to discipline free riders, allowing the group to attain high contributions 
and therefore producing efficient outcomes.
3 Results suggest that decentralized sanctions 
are a robust mechanism for stabilizing cooperation in anonymous groups.  
 
The result above, however, is obtained in a system with completely accurate information 
concerning the cooperation rates of all group members. To the best of our knowledge we are 
the first to systematically vary the accuracy of contribution signals in a public goods game 
with sanctioning mechanism.
4 The crucial question is how people behave if they are faced 
with noisy information about others’ behavior. One could claim that, following the prevalent 
idea  of  a  common  rationale  to  avoid  “type  I”  errors,  subjects  abstain  from  applying 
sanctions. As a consequence, the group's total welfare declines if there is noisy information: 
defectors will not be disciplined by sanctions, meaning that cooperation cannot be improved. 
 
                                                 
2 Some economic scholars have explored the optimal degree of noisiness for sanctioning relevant 
information, given that one can quantify the social costs of “type I” and “type II” errors (see, e.g., 
Kaplow & Shavell, 1994, Polinsky & Shavell, 2000, 2007, Lando, 2009, Rizzolli & Saraceno, 2009). 
3 Earlier studies on sanctions in social dilemma games are Yamagishi (1986) and Ostrom et al. (1992). 
Herrmann  et  al.  (2008)  show,  however,  that  the  positive  effect  of  the  punishment  option  on 
contributions is not ubiquitous. They report data from a cross cultural experiment which shows the 
effectiveness of the punishment option depends on cultural factors. 
4 Loosely related is a study by Fatas et al. (2009), who study the effect of a central sanctioning 
mechanism that punishes arbitrary subjects dependent on a group's joint contributions. Levati et al. 
(2009) study the effect of uncertainty about the marginal benefits of the public good.   4 
In fact, our results are even worse. We find that a large degree of noise does not discourage 
punishment.  Our  evidence  even  suggests  that  the  more  noise  we  introduce,  the  more 
punishment subjects apply. On the other hand, subjects do not differ systematically with 
respect to their response to received punishment in the noisy information regime and in the 
accurate information regime. As a consequence, defectors are mildly sanctioned and adjust 
their behavior only slightly (although severe punishment would lead to stronger corrections), 
whereas  many  cooperators  are  punished.  The  overall  welfare  assessment  of  punishment 
under noisy information is devastating. Compared to the punishment regime under accurate 
information,  the  introduction  of  a  minor  degree  of  noise  already  decreases  welfare 
substantially;  welfare  is  equivalent  to  that  obtained  in  a  game  without  a  punishment 
mechanism. Introducing a major degree of noise, finally, yields welfare below that obtained 
in the game without punishment. This result is remarkable, as people could simply choose 
not to make use of punishment.  
 
Our results have important policy implications. Even though there may be circumstances in 
reality with perfect information, in the vast majority of legal cases information is unavailable 
or prohibitively costly to obtain. Cases brought to court typically involve uncertainty with 
respect to crucial facts. Not surprisingly, rules of legal procedure are inherently based on the 
incidence of error (e.g. Shavell, 2004, 451, Wistrich et al., 2005) and the law in general 
respects the fact that some information is private (e.g. Baird et al., 2003, 79). Our findings 
suggest that regulators may be well advised not to offer any sanctioning mechanism at all if 
there is a substantial degree of noise. In other words, if installing a sanctioning system with 
or  without  punishment  were  an  endogenous  choice  variable,  the  issue  of  information 
accuracy (or the costs for accurate information) would crucially affect the decision whether 
to opt for such a system or not. 
 
One example which reflects our findings nicely is public international law. It deals with social 
dilemma  settings  (pollution,  use  of  natural  resources,  nuclear  activities  etc.),  where 
information is typically difficult or impossible to obtain due to the nature of the issues and 
because  of  state  sovereignty  (Shaw,  2008).  The  fact  that  public  international  law  is 
characterized  by  few  (decentralized)  sanctioning  mechanisms  and  by  many  treaties  with 
information obligations follows the rationale of our findings. Even though these features have 
historically evolved for different reasons (Brownlie, 2008, Shaw, 2008), our results suggest 
that they may be good from a welfare perspective.  
   5 
Another example is criminal law where high standards of proof are required. Convictions 
under  criminal  law  require  proof  beyond  reasonable  doubt  for  every  fact  necessary  in 
constituting a crime (United States Supreme Court, 1970). Considering the enormous social 
costs of “type I” errors, and, on the other hand, people’s willingness to impose sanctions 
even  under  high  uncertainty,  rules  of  evidence  that  require  substantial  information  are 
socially optimal. 
 
This  article  proceeds  as  follows.  We  begin  by  describing  our  experimental  design,  which 
exposes subjects to an environment where they can cooperate in providing a public good. 
Treatment conditions vary as to whether subjects are able to impose costly sanctions on 
others and as to the accuracy of information with respect to others’ cooperation rates. We 
then discuss some expectations regarding subjects’ behavior vis à vis different degrees of 
information  accuracy.  Finally,  we  present  our  experimental  results,  and  conclude  with  a 




Our  experimental  tool  is  the  standard  voluntary  contribution  mechanism  (VCM)  with  and 
without decentralized punishment. This design has been widely tested (see Zelmer, 2003, for 
an overview) and it allows for both an efficiency analysis and for general applications to the 
law. 
 
More precisely, we analyze behavior in a standard repeated VCM game with four players and 
ten periods. The group composition remains constant over the ten periods (partner design). 
At  the  beginning  of  each  period,  each  player  receives  an  endowment  of  20  ECU 
(experimental currency units). Players simultaneously choose how many ECU to contribute to 
the public good, gi, with gi ∈ {0,1,2,…,20}. Each ECU contributed to the public good yields a 
benefit of 0.4 ECU (the marginal per capita return) to every player in the group.  
 
After  the  contributions  are  made,  each  player  receives  a  signal  sj  (j≠i)  about  the 
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s         (1) 
where  ɶ
j g  is an independent random draw from {0,1,2,….,20}\{gj}, all numbers with equal 
probability. Thus each number (except gi) is equally likely to appear if the signal does not   6 
correspond to the actual contribution. The three signals are shown in a random sequence, 
making the identification of the other players impossible. 
 
In the game without the punishment option, players are then informed about their earnings 
in the period and proceed to the next period. In the game with the punishment option, 
players enter a second stage. Here they can punish other players. For this purpose, each 
player receives an extra endowment of 10 ECU in every period.
5 Each punishment point 
assigned to another player leads to a deduction of three ECUs from the punished player's 
account, but also reduces the punisher's income by one ECU. Each player can spend up to 
10 ECU on punishment. ECUs not spent on punishment are credited to the particular player's 
account. Denoting punishment points that player i assigns to player j as  ≠ ( )
j
i p j i , it follows 
10.
j
i j p ≤ ∑  Player i’'s payoff in a given period, πi, is  
( ) 20 0.4 10  3 .      
j i
i i j i j j j i j i g g p p π
≠ ≠ = − + + − − ∑ ∑ ∑    (2) 
After each period, players learn their own payoff and the points they received (but get no 
detailed information on who distributed points). Players then proceed to the next period; 
payoffs accrue over ten periods. All parameters, the signal technology, and payoff functions 
are common knowledge. 
 
We apply four treatment conditions, three with a sanctioning mechanism and one without 
sanctioning: 
•  In  the  P/1  treatment,  subjects  receive  accurate  signals  about  the  other  group 
members' contributions (λ=1) and may use the sanctioning mechanism. 
•  In  the  P/.9  treatment,  the  signal  is  accurate  in  90  percent  of  the  cases.  In  ten 
percent of the cases, the signal does not correspond to the contribution of the other 
group member (λ=.9). After receiving information on the contributions, subjects may 
use the sanctioning mechanism. 
•  In the P/.5 treatment, the signal is accurate in only 50 percent of the cases (λ=.5). 
After receiving information on the contributions, subjects may use the sanctioning 
mechanism. 
•  In the N/.5 treatment, the signal is accurate in only 50 percent of the cases (λ=.5), 
and there is no sanctioning mechanism available. 
                                                 
5 By introducing an extra endowment for punishment, we depart slightly from the “standard setting” 
of this game. However, we avoid the following problem in doing so: The earnings from the public 
good (and, consequently, the average contribution of all players to the public good) are unknown at 
this stage of the game. The extra endowment prevents subjects from having to speculate about their 
earnings when choosing the amount of their income they want to spend for punishment points.   7 
For comparison, we use data from an experiment by Hermann et al. (2008), who conducted 
a VCM game with identical parameters, in the same lab, and with the same subject pool, 
without punishment and accurate signals (denoted as N/1). 
 
We ran a total of 8 sessions with 48 groups (192 subjects), providing us with 12 independent 
observations  per  treatment  condition.  Each  subject  participated  in  only  one  treatment 
condition; none of the subjects had previously participated in a public good experiment. The 
experiments were conducted at the laboratory for economic experiments (EconLab) at the 
University  of  Bonn  in  January  to  March  2009  with  mostly  undergraduate  students  from 
various fields.
6 Once all subjects were seated, the written instructions were handed to them 
before the experimenter read them out loud.
7 Subjects were given the opportunity to ask 
any questions they might have privately. After questions had been answered individually, 
subjects had to solve a set of control questions.
8 A session lasted for about 60 minutes. 
Payoffs earned were converted at an exchange rate of 1 Euro per 40 ECUs. Subjects earned 
on average 13.67 Euro





Assuming common knowledge of rationality and selfish preferences, the unique subgame 
perfect  Nash  equilibrium  is  that  no  player  contributes  to  the  public  good.  The  reason  is 
simple: each ECU contributed yields 0.4 ECU but costs 1 ECU. If the game is played for a 
finite number of periods the rationale remains unchanged; reasons like reputation building at 
the beginning of the sequence do not matter from a theoretical point of view: since no 
player contributes in the last period (in this period, reputation building is irrelevant), it is also 
rational not to contribute in the second to last period, and so on until the very first period. 
Irrespective  of  the  other  group  members’  decisions,  not  contributing  maximizes  payoffs. 
However, the group earns four times 0.4 for each ECU contributed. Therefore, the social 
welfare of the group (defined as the sum of payoffs of all group members) is maximized if all 
players fully contribute. Hence, the VCM game provides us with an individual measure for 
cooperation and allows us to investigate the efficiency of group outcomes. 
                                                 
6 Four percent of participants were non students, 52 percent of participants were females, and age 
ranged between 16 and 47 (median 22). The experiment was programmed in zTree (Fischbacher, 
2007); we used ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) for recruiting. 
7 Instructions are adapted from Hermann et al. (2008); a translated English version is enclosed in 
Appendix A. 
8 Control questions are enclosed in Appendix B. 
9 13.67 Euro corresponds to 18.70 US dollars in February 2010.   8 
What changes if we introduce sanctions? Given that punishment is costly for the punisher, 
norm enforcement by punishment itself is a public good: the entire group participates in the 
benefits stemming from the players who punish, while the punisher bears the costs alone. 
This design reflects the fact that enforcement of many legal rights is time consuming and not 
profitable from a purely monetary point of view. Hence, under standard assumptions, no 
player will exert punishment; and contributions will be the same as in the game without 
sanctions. 
 
There  is  ample  experimental  evidence  that  theoretical  predictions  under  standard 
assumptions  are  a  poor  description  of  actual  behavior.  Subjects  contribute  to  the  public 
good; subjects make use of the punishment option, defectors receive punishment points, 
and  cooperators  sometimes  receive  punishment,  too.  Contributions  decline  over  time  if 
sanctioning  is  not  available,  but  remain  stable  or increase  if  sanctioning  is  possible  (see 
Hermann et al., 2008, for example). All existing results, however, are established only under 
accurate information about other subjects’ contributions.  
 
How  should  inaccurate  information  about  other  players'  contributions  influence  behavior? 
The most direct effect is certainly the effect on punishment. In treatments with punishment, 
noise makes separating defectors from cooperative subjects more difficult. Previous evidence 
strongly  suggests  that  the  targeted  subjects’  contribution  is  the  major  determinant  of 
punishment.  Most  of  the  studies  find  that  punishment  is  predominantly  directed  towards 
defectors  (Fehr  &  Gächter,  2000,  2002).
10  If  punishment  is  used  to  enforce  cooperation 
norms, subjects should become more reluctant to use the punishment option if there is the 
danger of erroneous punishment, i.e., “type I” errors. We thus hypothesize that the use of 
punishment  is  decreasing  for  decreasing  information  accuracy,  that  is,  most  punishment 
should be observed in P/1. We expect less punishment in P/.9, and the least amount in P/.5, 
where the signal is largely uninformative. 
 
How do subjects respond to punishment? Although punishment is predominantly directed to 
defectors,  some  punishment  is  also  directed  towards  cooperators,  so called  antisocial 
punishment. Typically, antisocial punishment leads to a substantial decline in contributions 
from  the  targeted  subject  in  subsequent  periods.  The  crucial  question is  whether  or  not 
                                                 
10  Recent  studies  (e.g.,  Cinyabuguma  et  al.,  2006)  investigate  punishment  directed  towards 
cooperators.  Gächter  et  al.  (2005)  and  Herrmann  et  al.  (2008)  show  that  the  degree  of  such 
“antisocial punishment” is decisive with respect to the efficiency of the punishment mechanism in 
establishing cooperative results. The latter study also reports data from Bonn, where our experiments 
took place. In this subject pool, antisocial punishment is of little importance.    9 
noise increases this damage due to an increased number of “type I” errors.
11 One can claim 
that punishment loses its legitimacy, meaning that that subjects who receive punishment 
points in these cases cease to respond as punishment is noisy. The victims of antisocial 
punishment may thus take this into account, suggesting that the social damage due to “type 
I”  errors  is  less  severe  than  under  accurate  information.  However,  there  might  be  more 
instances of erroneous punishment and therefore, of antisocial punishment under noise. It is 
a  priori  unclear  whether  overall  social  damage  due  to  “type  I”  errors  increases  due  to 
decreasing information accuracy. 
 
Punishment is not the only channel, however, through which noise about the contribution 
information might affect cooperation. It is unclear whether less accurate information makes 
subjects more optimistic or more pessimistic about other subjects' contributions. Previous 
evidence suggests that a large fraction of the subjects can be characterized as conditionally 
cooperative (Fischbacher et al., 2001), that is, subjects who contribute only if they expect 
others to do so as well. Subjects in repeated public goods settings can use others’ previous 
period behavior to form beliefs about their contributions in the current period. The fact that 
other subjects use the information about a subject’s contributions introduces an incentive to 
signal cooperative behavior: subjects who expect others to be conditionally cooperative have 
a  strategic  incentive  for  choosing  high  contributions  early  in  the  game  to  induce  other 
subjects to contribute. Noise may weaken the strategic incentive for initial contributions, as 
the high cooperation signal is distorted. In order to identify effects of signal distortion on 
contributions we compare the treatments without punishment opportunities (i.e., N/1 against 
N/.5).  
 
Finally, a comparison of the P/.5 and the N/.5 treatment will allow us to test for the welfare 
implications  of  sanctioning  under  noisy  information  at  its  extreme.  In  other  words,  we 
analyze whether the social damage of a regime that minimizes “type I” errors at the cost of 
“type II” errors leads to superior social welfare than a regime that allows for “type I” errors 
in  order  to  avoid  “type  II”  errors.  More  precisely,  a  comparison  of  the  two  treatments 
answers  the  following  question:  does  the  regime  N/.5  that  rules  out  “type  I”  errors  by 
construction  but  allows  for  “type  II”  errors  (due  to  the  absence  of  any  sanctioning 
mechanism) lead to more efficient outcomes than the regime P/.5 that is potentially subject 
                                                 
11 Of course, given accurate information, antisocial punishment is not an error from the individual 
perspective. Reasons like spite or simply the joy of destruction may motivate this type of punishment. 
However, from the perspective of the entire group or the one of a social planer, this is erroneous 
punishment.   10 
to both types of errors? The answer to this question is a priori unclear; our experimental 




In the first subsection, we investigate how the use of the punishment option depends on the 
accuracy of the signal. Then we analyze our subjects’ responses to received punishment and 
see how average contributions react to our treatment variables. Finally, we analyze overall 
welfare in the different treatment conditions.  
 
Punishment despite reasonable doubt 
 
According to our hypotheses, there should be less punishment in treatments with higher 
degrees of noise. Figure 1 shows the average number of punishment points in the three 
treatments with punishment and differing signal accuracy. The result is surprising. Contrary 
to our hypothesis, higher noise leads to more punishment. On average, subjects distribute 
0.46  punishment  points  per  occasion
12  in  P/.5,  0.36  points  in  P/.9,  and  0.28  in  P/1.  A 
conservative test based on twelve independent group averages in each treatment shows that 
the difference between P/1 and P/.5 is significant at p=0.043 (Wilcoxon rank sum test, two 
sided). The comparisons between P/.9 and the other two treatments are not significant.  
 
Punishment expenditures thus increase with noise. A closer look at the punishment decisions 
(see  below)  reveals  that  the  introduction  of  noise  has  two  opposing  effects:  (i)  noise 
increases the frequency of punishment acts, but (ii) it decreases the intensity of punishment 
for a specific punishment act. As shown in figure 1, the former effect is clearly stronger, 









                                                 
12 An occasion is a bilateral relation between two subjects in a period. Thus, a subject makes three 
punishment decisions in every period.   11 



































We  apply  regression  analyses  for  a  more  detailed  examination.  Table  1  shows  Tobit 
estimates with the punishment decision as dependent variable. We report robust standard 
errors in parentheses, clustered on the group level. In Model 1, we use dummies for the two 
treatments P/.9 and P/.5 and the variable Period to identify time effects. The dummy for the 
P/.5 is significantly positive, indicating that punishment was stronger in the case where the 
signal was very unreliable. In Model 2, we include the difference between the signal and the 
punisher's  contribution,  sj – gi,  denoted  as  diff.  The  literature  identified  the  difference 
between  a  punisher's  contribution  and  that  of  the  punished  subject  as  an  important 
determinant of punishment behavior (see Herrmann et al., 2008, for example). We allow for 
different  slopes  for  the  cases  where  the  signal  is  higher  and  lower  than  the  punisher's 
contribution by introducing the variable diff+ for positive deviations: the variable equals diff 
if sj > gi, but is zero otherwise. The treatment dummies are insignificant once we control for 
the  deviations  in  the  contributions.  The  deviation  variables  have  the  expected  signs:  we 
observe a highly significant negative coefficient for negative deviations (sj < gi), that is, the 
lower the signal, the higher the punishment. We find evidence for antisocial punishment for 
positive deviations, given a significantly positive coefficient.
13  
 
However, the dependence of the punishment decision on the signal contribution difference is 
likely  to  depend  on  the  noise  of  the  signal.  In  Model  3,  we  allow  for  differences  in  the 
reaction to the signal between the three treatments. We introduce interaction terms for the 
treatment  dummies  and  the  two  measures  for  deviation.  In  case  of  negative  deviations 
                                                 
13 The effect represents the sum of both estimated coefficients (that is, −0.304 + 0.388 = 0.084), 
which, jointly tested, is significant (p = 0.042).   12 
(sj < gi), both treatments with noisy signals have significantly less steep slopes, indicating 
that punishment is less strongly connected to the deviation between the signal and the own 
contribution. In other words, if the signal indicates that a subject is likely to be a free rider, 
punishment is weaker if signals are less accurate. In case of positive deviations, only the 
interaction  term  for  the  treatment  with  high  noise  is  significant,  which  means  that  high 
positive deviations are punished less strongly in P/.5 compared to the treatment with the 
perfect signal. If we allow for different slopes, the treatment dummy for P/.5 becomes highly 
significant, suggesting that small deviations are punished much more strongly under a high 
degree of noise. As in model 1, the highly significant coefficient of P/.5 indicates stronger 
punishment with higher degrees of noise.  
 
Table 1: Tobit estimates for the punishment decision 
   Dependent variable: Punishment points 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
P/.9  0.628   0.053  0.063 
  (0.703)  (0.578)  (0.626) 
P/.5  1.388**  0.249  1.952*** 
  (0.624)  (0.584)  (0.656) 
Period    0.124***   0.091***   0.078*** 
  (0.037)  (0.033)  (0.030) 
diff      0.304***   0.474*** 
    (0.035)  (0.048) 
diff+    0.388***  0.652*** 
    (0.067)  (0.071) 
diff x P/.9      0.133** 
      (0.059) 
diff+ x P/.9       0.118 
      (0.098) 
diff x P/.5      0.319*** 
      (0.065) 
diff+ x P/.5       0.586*** 
      (0.092) 
Constant   3.086***   3.340***   3.829*** 
  (0.551)  (0.469)  (0.559) 
Standard error of estimate  3.422  2.907  2.804 
F  4.920***  20.161***  29.390*** 
Pseudo R²  0.012  0.091  0.110 
N  4320  4320  4320 
 
Note: Tobit estimates for the punishment decision. Robust standard errors, clustered on the group 
level in parentheses. Summary statistics: standard error of the estimate; the F test statistic; Pseudo 
R² reports the goodness of fit for the models; N denotes the number of observations. ***: significant 
at p <.01, **: at p < .05; *: at p < .1. 
 
To summarize our results about subjects' willingness to distribute points, contrary to our 
expectations, noise does not discourage punishment. Subjects do not seem to take “type I”   13 
errors into account and in fact punish despite reasonable doubt! The connection between the 
signal and the punishment decision is substantially weakened, however. Our subjects thus do 
react to our treatment variation. However, noise does not discourage punishment, but simply 
leads to more unsystematic punishment. 
 
The reaction to (mis)guided sanctions 
 
Exploring the response to received punishment allows us to test whether punishment under 
noise stabilizes or erodes cooperative behavior. Experimental evidence suggests that under 
perfect information, punishment maintains or even enhances cooperation due to the fact 
that free riders increase their contribution when being punished. The reaction to received 
punishment is much less clear under noise because a subject never knows, whether the 
punishment was deliberate or due to a false signal. In order to analyze the effect of received 
punishment, we run OLS regressions for the difference in a subject's contributions between 
two  consecutive  periods  as  the  dependent  variable.  Particularly,  let  us  define   t  as  the 
contribution  in  period  t  less  the  contribution  in  period  t−1,  i.e., 
1 t t
t i i g g
−   = − .  Thus,  a 
negative  t    indicates a decrease in contributions, while a positive  t    indicates an increase 
in contributions.  
 
As  before,  we  use  the  dummy  variables  P/.9  and  P/.5  to  identify  the  effect  of  noisy 
information.  Furthermore,  let  us  define  the  variable  sum  p  rec  as  the  number  of  points 
subject i receives in period t−1. Hence, sum p rec measures the effect of punishment points 
received on contributions in the consecutive period. Interaction terms with P/.9 and P/.5 
identify differences across treatment conditions. Finally, we introduce two control variables 
to  disentangle  the  effect  of  punishment  from  other  variables  that  influence  contribution 
decisions. First, in order to control for peer effects, we measure the sum of contributions by 
all other subjects in t−1 by the variable sum c. Thus the variable indicates positive effects of 
observing  other  subjects  contributing  to  the  public  good  on  own  contribution  decisions. 
Second, we include the variable Period to identify time effects.  
 
The  reaction  to  received  punishment  is  likely  to  differ  between  subjects  with  a  high 
contribution  and  those  with  a  low  contribution.  We  therefore  estimate  two  regression 
models, one for contribution decisions where the subject contributed less than the average 
in period t−1; and one for contribution decisions where the subject contributed the average 
or more than the average in period t−1. Thus, the separation into two models allows us to 
test whether the effect of punishment received as a free rider differs from that received as a   14 
cooperator. The former we call pro social punishment, the latter antisocial punishment.
14 The 
results of our estimations are summarized in Table 2. The first column reports the findings 
for received pro social punishment, the second column for received antisocial punishment. 
 
Table 2: Estimates for the response to received punishment 
  Dependent variable:  t 
contributed in t−1: less than average  more or equal to average 
P/.9  0.374  −0.501* 
  (1.006)  (0.277) 
P/.5  0.118  −1.426** 
  (0.995)  (0.558) 
sum p rec
  0.724***  −0.465*** 
  (0.172)  (0.142) 
sum p rec x P/.9  −0.068  −0.017 
  (0.276)  (0.316) 
sum p
 rec x P/.5  −0.156  0.286 
  (0.329)  (0.291) 
sum c
  −0.227**  −0.232*** 
  (0.092)  (0.050) 
Period  −0.099  0.084* 
  (0.066)  (0.050) 
Constant  3.250**  −0.596 
  (1.477)  (0.961) 
F(9,35)  6.450***  10.713*** 
R²  0.100  0.069 
N  462  834 
 
Note: OLS regression for the change in contribution from t–1 to t. Robust standard errors, clustered 
on the group level in parentheses. Summary statistics: the F test statistic; R² reports the goodness of 
fit for the models; N denotes the number of observations. ***: significant at p <.01, **: at p < .05; 
*: at p < .1. 
 
Our  estimations  show  a  number  of  interesting  results:  With  respect  to  the  response  to 
punishment, we find a positive response to received pro social punishment, whereas there is 
a negative response in terms of contributions to received antisocial punishment (as indicated 
by the significant positive and negative coefficients for sum p rec). In contrast to punishment 
behavior,  there  seems  to  be  no  systematic  significant  difference  in  this  reaction  across 
treatment  conditions.  This  result  suggests  that  “type  I”  errors  of  punishment  cause 
                                                 
14 Unlike before the definition of pro  and antisocial punishment relies on the consequences, not on 
intentions.  Judging  whether  punishment  is  intentionally  antisocial  or  erroneous  is  difficult  in  the 
presence of noise because punished subjects receive no feedback on whether the punisher acted 
under  accurate  information.  Therefore,  a  receiver's  reference  point  for  determining  antisocial 
punishment (if there is one at all) is the average contribution.   15 
substantial damages to social welfare, regardless of whether the information is perfect or 
imperfect.  
 
Overall, the significant negative coefficients for P/.9 and P/.5 show that contributions decline 
more strongly for those subjects who contributed more or at the average if information is 
noisy. Interestingly, there is a significant negative peer effect (indicated by the coefficients 
of sum c), showing that subjects reduce their contribution the more others contributed to the 
public good in the previous period. Finally, there is only a weakly significant time trend for 
the  change  in  contribution,  again  restricted  to  subjects  who  contributed  more  or  at  the 
average. Here, contributions decline towards the end of the experiment. 
  
To  summarize  our  findings,  we  find  the  effect  of  “type  I”  errors  of  punishment  to  be 
substantial and negative, and this effect does not seem to differ with respect to various 
degrees of information accuracy.  
 
Uncertainty and contributions 
 
Based  on  the  results  for  punishment,  we  expect  to  find  lower  cooperation  rates  for 
increasing degrees of noise. Figure 2 shows the average contributions over the ten periods in 
the five treatments. When subjects are perfectly informed about others' contributions, we 
confirm  previous  experimental  studies  and  find  significantly  more  cooperation  if  the 
punishment mechanism is available (16.8 in P/1 versus 9.2 in N/1, p < 0.001, Wilcoxon rank 
sum test, two sided). This well known result in the literature (Fehr & Gächter, 2000, 2002) 
does not hold, however, if we introduce noise. With a high degree of noise, punishment does 
not  lead  to  significantly  higher  contributions  when  compared  to  the  game  without 
punishment but otherwise identical information conditions (11.3 in P/.5 versus 8.8 in N/.5, 
p = 0.133). For mildly imperfect information, we find no significant difference in average 
contributions (16.8 in P/1 versus 16.4 in P/.9, p = 0.326). A low degree of noise does not 
seem to affect cooperation. Punishment with accurate or nearly accurate information over 
contributions leads to very high levels of contributions (compare Figure 2).  
 
On  the  other  hand,  we  find  a  highly  significant  difference  between  the  punishment 
treatments  P/1  and  P/.5  (p < 0.001).  A  high  level  of  noise  substantially  harms  the   16 




In addition, the data allows us to investigate the effect of uncertainty on contributions in the 
absence of the punishment option. We find no significant differences in this case (9.2 in N/1 
versus  8.8  in  N/.5,  p = 0.807).  As  long  as  no  punishment  mechanism  is  available,  the 
contribution rates are almost identical across treatments, suggesting that noise by itself has 
no effect. Thus, signal distortion and its implication on the strategic incentives to contribute 
initially to the public good seem not to influence cooperation rates essentially. 
 






































Note: Data of N/1 from Herrmann et al. (2008). 
 
Welfare consequences of punishment under noisy information 
 
In the final step, we investigate how the availability of punishment under noise affects social 
welfare overall. In other words, we test whether introducing the risk of “type I” and “type II” 
errors for punishment harms efficiency or not. Efficiency is a linear function of contributions 
in  the  treatments  without  punishment,  and  the  two  treatments  without  punishment  are 
                                                 
15  Indeed,  a  simple  OLS  regression  with  the  period  as  single  independent  variable  results  in  no 
significant  trend  (β = −0.24  and  p = 0.178)  in  P/.5.  For  two  treatments  without  punishment  we 
observe a much stronger and highly significant negative trend (p = 0.000).   17 
therefore almost identical with regard to efficiency.
16 There are additional efficiency losses in 
treatments with punishment, due to received punishment and punishment expenditures.  
P/1 is significantly more efficient than P/.5. Average earnings over the ten periods are 36.7 
in the former and 31.2 in the latter. This difference is highly significant (p = 0.007, Wilcoxon 
rank sum test, two sided). Thus, the reduction of information between the two treatments 
has real costs for the subjects. In relative terms, players in P/.5 realize only 10% of the 
maximum gains that could have been realized from the public good, while they realize 56% 
in  P/1.
17  Comparing  P/.5  and  N/.5  shows  that  if  noise  is  present,  overall  welfare  is 
significantly  lower  when  the  sanctioning  mechanism  is  available  (31.2  versus  35.3, 
p = 0.007). In relative terms, there is an increase from 10% (P/.5) to 44% (N/.5). This 
result is striking, since participants could simply choose not to make use of the punishment 
mechanism.  
 
Given that contributions decline in the treatments without punishment, we check whether 
this difference remains significant in later periods.
18 For this purpose, we compute relative 
efficiency gains for the first (period 1 5) and the second half (period 6 10) of the experiment 
separately  in  Figure  3.  Comparing  the  perfect  information  settings  over  all  ten  periods, 
welfare  is  higher  when  punishment  is  available,  though  insignificantly  so  (p = 0.157, 
Wilcoxon rank sum test, two sided). This insignificance is due to the fact that punishment 
does not yield immediate effects but needs some time to fully discipline non cooperators. 
Thus, a substantial amount of efficiency is lost in order to maintain and increase cooperation. 
We find significant differences in efficiency (p = 0.008) when punishment is available for the 
second half of the experiment, where the sanctioning mechanism enhances efficiency. 
 
Finally, the efficiency obtained in the P/.9 treatment reveals an important result. Although 
information contains only a mild degree of noise, efficiency is hardly enhanced between the 
first  and  the  second  half  of  the  experiment,  in  contrast  to  the  P/1  treatment.  As  a 
consequence, efficiency in the second half is lower in P/.9 than in P/1 (p = 0.072) and does 
not differ significantly from that obtained in N/.5 and N/1 (p = 0.162, the two N treatments 
                                                 
16 Since participants received no extra endowment in N/1, we hypothetically add 10 ECU to their 
payoffs (as we actually did in the N/.5 treatment) to compare results with other treatments. 
17 Maximal efficiency (100%) is obtained if all subjects earn 42 ECU (and, consequently, average 
earnings of 42 ECU) implying full contributions by all group members and no punishment at all. As 
minimal efficiency (0%), we define the outcome of the Nash equilibrium under standard assumptions, 
which is 30 ECU (in treatments with punishment lower payoffs are possible but did not occur in our 
experiment). 
18  Previous  evidence  shows  that  efficiency  gains  from  punishment  are  often  realized  only  in  later 
periods of interactions (see, e.g., Gächter et al., 2008).   18 
pooled).  Even  a  very  small  amount  of  noise  has  profound  implications  for  welfare 
consequences of punishment.  
 
On  the  other  hand,  the  efficiency  gain  in  case  of  punishment  with  perfect  information 
compared  to  the  treatments  without  punishment  is  even  stronger  in  the  second  half 
(p = 0.002, the two N treatments pooled). The efficiency loss under high degrees of noise 
relative  to  the  treatments  without  punishment  is  persistent  in  the  second  half  of  the 
experiment (p = 0.019, the two N treatments pooled). 
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Our experimental results show that noise crucially influences the effect of punishment on 
cooperation.  The  consequences  are  dramatic:  With  some  non trivial  degree  of  noise, 
punishment  cannot  maintain  high  cooperation  levels;  moreover,  it  decreases  efficiency 
substantially!  In  this  case,  efficiency  is  even  significantly  lower  than  in  a  world  without 
punishment mechanism. This result is surprising, since people could simply choose not to 
make use of punishment. Even very little noise decreases efficiency in later periods, when 
there  exists  a  punishment  option.  Despite  its  negative  implications,  people  are  willing  to 
punish and do so even under a high degree of noise. People spend a substantial amount on 
punishment, while cooperation is poorly maintained. 
   19 
As we have already shown in the introduction, there is a number of examples from the law 
that  correlate  nicely  with  our  findings.  The  fact  that  sanctions  are  restricted  in  public 
international  law  accounts  for  both  the  little  information  available  to  parties  and  the 
decentralization of sanctions in a public good environment. The underlying idea is similar to 
the prohibition of war pronounced in the Kellogg–Briand Pact of 1928 and amplified in the 
United Nations Charters after World War II. Acts of aggression mistakenly taken as a result 
of false information may erode cooperation. This development is almost unavoidable if the 
other parties' actions are not observable, unless there is a strict restriction of retributive 
behavior. 
 
Under national legal systems, the standards of proof serve as a similar limitation of errors in 
sanctions. They range from a relatively high degree of information accuracy in criminal law 
to much lower requirements in civil procedures. Convictions under criminal law require proof 
beyond  reasonable  doubt  of  every  fact  necessary  to  constitute  a  crime  (United  States 
Supreme Court, 1970). Laws of civil procedure often require “clear and convincing evidence” 
or  “preponderance  of  the  evidence”  (United  States  Supreme  Court,  1982).  Various 
quantifications  of  the  standards  of  proof  have  been  offered  for  both  criminal  offences 
(Newman, 1993, Tillers, 2006) and civil procedure (Kaye, 1982, Sanchirico, 1997, Hay & 
Spier, 1997). Rules of evidence that require substantial information may be socially optimal, 
given that people are willing to impose sanctions on others, even under high degrees of 
noise.  They  prevent  a  dynamic  that  starts  with  an  erroneous  sanction  due  to  false 
information,  and  leads  to  the  erosion  of  pro social  behavior.  Standards  of  proof  are  a 
sensible tool for limiting potentially devastating effects of sanctions. 
 
Overall, the legal implications of our findings are two fold: if enforcement is based on noisy 
information,  not  offering  sanctions  might  be  better.  Since  cooperative  behavior  may  be 
eroded, a system based on intrinsic motivations may be superior to a system with sanctions. 
In other words, in those instances where the initiation of a sanctioning system has to be 
chosen, decision makers have to take the quality of information on which punishment is 
based into account, as well as the corresponding welfare losses due to “type I” errors. If 
punishment  is  available,  sanctions  need  to  be  conditioned  on  substantial  information 
accuracy, so that the social damage due to “type I” errors is minimized. 
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Appendix A: Instructions for the P/.5 treatment
19 
General explanations for participants  
You  are  taking  part  in  an  economic  science  experiment.  If  you  read  the  following 
explanations carefully, you can earn a rather significant sum of money, depending on the 
decisions you make. It is therefore very important that you pay attention to the following 
points.  
 
The instructions you have received from us are intended solely for your private information. 
During the experiment, you will not be allowed to communicate with anyone. Should you 
have any questions, please direct them directly to us. Not abiding by this rule will lead to 
exclusion from the experiment and from any payments.  
 
In  this  experiment,  we  calculate  in  taler,  rather  than  in  Euro.  Your  entire  income  will 
therefore initially be calculated in taler. The total sum of taler will later be calculated in Euro 
as follows: 
  10 taler = 25 Euro cents 
 
The euro you will have accrued plus 2.50 Euro for your participation will be paid to you in 
cash at the end of the experiment.  
 
The  experiment  is  divided  into  separate  periods.  It  consists  of  a  total  of  10  periods. 
Participants are randomly assigned to groups of four. Each group, thus, has three other 
members, apart from you. During these 10 periods, the constellation of your group of four 
will remain unaltered. You will therefore be in the same group for 10 periods. Please note 
that the identification number assigned to you and the other members of the group changes 
randomly  in  each  period.  Therefore,  group  members  cannot  be  identified  as  the  periods 
progress.  
 
Each participant will receive from us one installment of 50 taler, with which you will be able 
to counterbalance potential losses.  
 
                                                 
19  Differences  to  the  other  treatment  conditions  are  marked  with  footnotes.  Screens  differed 
accordingly.   24 
The following pages outline the exact procedure of the experiment. 
Information on the exact procedure of the experiment  
 






At  the  beginning  of  each  period,  each  participant  is  allotted  20  taler,  which  we  shall 
henceforth  refer  to  as  his  endowment.  The  player’s  job  is  now  to  make  a  decision  with 
regard to using his endowment. You have to decide how many of the 20 taler you wish to 
pay into a project and how many you wish to keep for yourself. The consequences of your 
decision are explained in greater detail below.  
 
At the beginning you will see the following input screen of Step 1: 
 
The input screen of step 1 
 
In the left upper corner of the screen you will find the period number. In the right upper 
corner you will find the remaining time for your decision in seconds. 
 
                                                 
20 Sentence is missing in N/.5.  
21 Missing in N/.5.    25 
Your endowment is, thus, 20 taler in each period. You make a decision on your project 
contribution by typing any one whole number between 0 and 20 into the appropriate field on 
your screen. This field can be accessed using the mouse. As soon as you have determined 
your contribution, you have also decided on how many taler to keep for yourself, i.e., 20 – 
your contribution. Once you have typed in your contribution, please click on OK, again using 
the mouse. Once you have done this, your decision for this period is irreversible.  
 
Your income therefore consists of two parts, namely: 
 
(1)  the taler you have kept for yourself 
(2)  the  income  gained  from  the  project”.  Your  income  from  the  project  is  calculated  as 
follows:  
Income from the project = .4 * total sum of all contributions to the project 
 
Your income in Step 1
22 of each period equals: 




– Your contribution to the project 
+.4*(total sum of contributions to the project) 
 
The total income in Step 1,
24 in taler, is calculated using the same formula for each member 
of the group. If, for example, the sum of the contributions from all group members adds up 
to 60 taler, you and all other members each receive a project income of .4x 60 = 24 taler. If 
the group members have contributed a total of 9 taler to the project, you and all other 
members each receive an income of .4x9 = 3.6 taler from the project.  
 
For each taler you keep for yourself, you earn an income of 1 taler. If, on the other hand, 
you contribute one taler from your endowment to your group’s project instead, the sum of 
the contributions to the project increases by one taler and your income from the project 
increases by .4x1 = .4 taler. However, the income of each individual group member also 
increases by .4 taler, so that the group’s total income increases by .4x4 = 1.6 taler. The 
other group members thereby also profit from your contributions to the project. In turn, you 
                                                 
22 “Income” in N/.5.  
23 “Income” in N/.5.  
24 “Income” in N/.5.    26 
profit from other members’ contributions to the project. For each taler contributed to the 




In Step 2, you can decrease each individual group member's income by giving points, or 
leave as it is. For this purpose, you receive an additional endowment of 10 taler which you 
may use to buy points. These taler form the additional endowment; any taler you do not use 
for acquisition of points are kept and added to your period income at the end of step 2. All 
other group members are allowed to decrease your income, too, if they so wish.  
 
You may assign points in the input screen of step 2 which shows, along the number of 
periods and the remaining time, for each group member a signal about the contribution to 
the project. Your contribution will be shown in the row “You”. 
 














Please  notice  that  the  signals  for  the  three  other  group  members  only  have  a  50% 
probability of equaling the actual contribution. This means that the signaled contribution to 
the project for each of the other group members equals their actual contribution in 5 out of 
10  cases  on  average.  There  is  a  50%  probability  that  you  will  see  a  random,  different 
number which does not correspond to the particular group member's contribution. In this 
                                                 
25 Unless indicated, the section “Step 2” is missing in N/.5.    27 
case, there is an equal probability that any other number than the actual contribution will 
appear.
26 
You now have to decide how many points you wish to distribute to each group member. You 
must enter a number at this stage. If you do not wish to alter a certain group member’s 
income, please enter 0. If you want to assign points, you have to choose a number greater 
than 0. You can operate within the fields by using the tab key (→|) or the mouse. You may 
still change your decision as long as you have not yet clicked on OK. 
 
When distributing points, you incur costs in taler which depend on the number of points you 
distribute to the individual players. The more points you distribute, the higher your costs are. 
The following formula shows the connection between the points distributed and the costs of 
such distribution:  
Costs for assigned points = sum of points (in taler) 
 
Each distributed point costs you 1 taler. Therefore, you can distribute a maximum of 10 
points. For example, if you have allocated 2 points to one member, your cost is 2 taler; if, in 
addition, you distribute 7 points to another group member, your cost is 7 taler; if you give 
the final group member 0 points, you have no costs. The total cost to you is therefore 9 taler 
(2+7+0). The remaining rest of the additional endowment for buying points, in this example 
1 taler, is kept and added at the end of step 2 to your period income.  
 
If you choose 0 points for a certain group member, you do not alter this group member’s 
income. If you allocate 1 point (choosing 1) to a group member, you decrease this particular 
group member’s taler income from Step 1 by 3 taler. If you allocate 2 points to a group 
member (choosing 2), you decrease his income by 6 taler etc. Each point allocated by you to 
a particular group member reduces the group member’s taler income from Step 1 by 3 taler.  
 
The overall reduction in a group member’s income from Step 1 depends on the total number 
of points received. If, for instance, one member receives a total of 3 points from all other 
members, the income in Step 1 is reduced by 9 taler. If a member receives a total of 4 
points, the income in Step 1 is reduced by 12 taler. A person who receives points will be 
informed about the income reduction at the end of each period, without detailed information 
on the group member who distributed that point.  
 
                                                 
26 In P/.9, “5” is replaced by “9” in the paragraph. In P/1, the paragraph is replaced by “The other 
signals correspond to the contributions of all other three group members.”   28 
For your total income at the end of step 2, it follows that: 
Total taler income at the end of step 2 = Period income = 
 
Income after step 1 
+ 10 (additional endowment for buying points) 
– 3*(sum of received points) 
– cost of points you distribute 
 
Please note that your total taler income at the end of step 2 can be negative if the costs for 
distributed points exceed the income after step 1 minus the reduction of income due to 
received points. 















27 all members of the group have made their decisions, you will be informed about your 
period income in the income screen at the end of Step 2.
28 Here, you see how many taler 
you kept for yourself, your income from the project, and the resulting income in Step 1.
29 In 
addition, you are informed about the costs for points you distributed, the number of points 
you received, as well as the resulting reduction in income.
 30 Finally, you will see your period 
income. 
 
                                                 
27 In N/.5, the following paragraph, screen, and formula are included in the instruction.  
28 In N/.5, “…in the income screen.”  
29 In N/.5, “…and the resulting income.”  
30 In N/.5, the sentence is replaced by “In addition, you receive an additional endowment of 10 taler 
that will be added to your income.”   29 
Your total income at the end of the experiment equals the sum of all period incomes:   
Total income (in taler) 
 
= Total sum of period incomes  
(If the sum of period incomes is negative, your income is 0 taler.) 
 
Do you have any further questions? 
 
Appendix B: Control questions
31 
Please answer all questions. There are no consequences for you due to wrong answers. If 
you have any questions, please contact us. 
 
1.  Each group member is endowed with 20 taler. None (including you) contributes anything 
in step 1. 
•  What is your income in step 1? 
•  What is the income of each of the other group members in step 1? 
2.  Each group member is endowed with 20 taler. Each group member (including you) 
contributes 20 taler to the project in step 1. 
•  What is your income in step 1? 
•  What is the income of each of the other group members in step 1? 
3.  Each group member is endowed with 20 taler. The other three group members 
contribute a total of 30 taler to the project in step 1. 
•  What is your income in step 1 if you contribute – in addition to the 30 taler – 0 taler 
to the project? 
•  What is your income in step 1 if you contribute – in addition to the 30 taler – 15 taler 
to the project? 
4.  Each group member is endowed with 20 taler. You contribute 8 taler to the project. 
•  What is your income in step 1 if the others group members contribute – in addition to 
your 8 taler – in total 7 taler to the project? 
•  What is your income in step 1 if the others group members contribute – in addition to 
your 8 taler – in total 22 taler to the project? 
5.  In step 2, you distribute points to each of the three other group members: 3, 5, and 0 
points. What are the total costs for the distribution of those points? 
                                                 
31 Questions 5 to 9 are missing in N/.5.    30 
6.  What are the total costs if you distribute to all group members 0 points? 
7.  What is the reduction of income in step 1 if you receive in total 0 points? 
8.  What is the reduction of income in step 1 if you receive in total 4 points? 
9.  What is the reduction of income in step 1 if you receive in total 15 points? 
 